Rabbinic approaches to women's performance of time-bound positive commandments have ranged widely over the course of Jewish history. Many factors account for this. In addition to the ever-changing conditions of Jewish society and culture in the medieval and modern periods, substantial variations in the economic, legal, and religious standing of women have exercised an abiding influence on their performance of rituals normally practiced by men.
The Rav Beit Yosef, (i.e. Caro's Shulhan Arukh), along with glosses 'the Torah that Moses set' (the glosses of R. Moses Isserles), writes succinctly and only presents the final decisions [of the Law], while my commentary. . .will discuss every matter thoroughly. . .and will explain, challenge, and advance unprecedented halakhic decisions. . .at times adding minor matters and customs--so that my commentary will lack nothing." 4 R. Bacharach felt that in his day there was still "no adequate commentary" available for Orach Hayyim, 5 in contrast to the other sections of the Shulhan Arukh, to which commentaries had already been written, 6 and he saw it as his mission to provide the definitive, comprehensive commentary that would fill the gap. 7 He therefore dealt with each section in sequence, citing the views of the rishonim and decisors who preceded him. On occasion he even provided a full explication of an entire Talmudic sugya. He offered novel explanations, halakhic decisions, and reasons for halakhot, and also cited Ashkenazic takkanot and minhagim. As a result, his work constitutes an important source for reconstructing the customs of Ashkenaz in general and those of the Worms community in particular. 8 The commentary provides indisputable evidence of R. Bacharach's complete mastery of the entire range of Talmudic and Rabbinic literature, including philosophy and kabbalah, up to his time. 9 In light of the above, the work is of great value for the study of the history of Jewish law and customs in both the traditional beit midrash and the academy. In Section 17 (Volume I, p. 96 of Mekor Hayyim) dealing with the laws of tzitzit, R. Bacharach discussed a question that had been addressed centuries earlier by the rishonim: why are women permitted to recite the blessings and invoke God's name when performing time-bound mitzvot from which they are exempt? Even though R. Moses Isserles (the Rema, 1520--1572), following R. Tam, rules that it is permissible (in paragraph 2) 11 R. Bacharach sought to understand the underlying rationale:
I have still not resolved [the question] as to how women are permitted to recite the blessings over time-bound mitzvot, and recite the words 'you sanctified us. . . and commanded us' when in truth they have not been so commanded. Is it not written (Ps. 101:7) "he who speaks untruth shall not stand before my eyes." . Thus, the concept of areyvut (mutual responsibility) should justify women's reciting the blessing even though they are not commanded. However, he continued, Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher 13 hold that women are not included in the principle "all Israel are guarantors for one another," since they are not explicitly mentioned as participants in the covenant entered into on Mount Gerizim and Mount Eval.
14 Their exclusion, then, created a broader problem: "Who are the guarantors on behalf of women, and on what basis do they accept and fulfill the words of the covenant and the yoke of the commandments?" While his initial question only relates to the legitimacy of women's blessings over time-bound commandments, R. Bacharach now questioned a more fundamental principle-on what basis did women enter into the covenant at Sinai and accept the obligation to perform the commandments?
THE SIMPLE ANSWER NOT OFFERED
There is an obvious answer to this question that is not offered by R. Bacharach. He was certainly aware that both men and women received the Torah at Mount Sinai, as the traditional understanding of the text clearly indicates. The Sages cite the following verse in Exodus 19:3: "and Moses went up to God". The Lord called to him from the mountain, saying, "Thus shall you say to the house of Jacob and declare to the sons of Israel." The Mekhilta comments: "'Shalt thou say to the House of Jacob.' That is, the women. 'And tell the sons of Israel.' That is, the men . . .Tell the women the main things in a mild tone. 'And tell the sons of Israel.' And be strict with them."
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Rashi quotes the words of the Mekhilta, and there are parallel statements in Targum Jonathan and later midrashim. 16 The Midrash Tanhuma 17 even contends that "the women received the Torah first." In the words of one of the earliest commentators on Rambam's Mishneh Torah, R. Manoah of Narbonne (13 th --14 th cent.), "Just as the Torah was given to the male Israelites, it was also given to the females." 18 The renowned commentator of the Midrash, R. Samuel Jaffe Ashkenazi (16th century), in his commentary Yefeh Toar, offered a psychological explanation for women's priority in receiving the Torah: "If the women were the last to receive the Torah they might think that (their observance) lacks significance. And upon further realizing that they are exempted from the mitzvah of Torah study and other commandments, their commitment might weaken, and their husbands might follow in kind. Therefore they were commanded first, to indicate that God regards their observance of the mitzvot [ 23 and Midrash Genesis Rabbah: 24 "R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar said: God created two faces in the first human being, as it says 'You have formed me before and behind.'" (Ps. 139:5). The Yefeh Toar explains: "Thus when man was separated [from woman] he was no longer complete," as the Zohar writes "male without female is half a body [person] ." Isaiah Tishby, the 20th century scholar of Kabbalah and Hasidism, explained that, "although the author of the Zohar designates the imperfection of bachelorhood as 'half a body' he really means 'half a soul,' because he believes that all the souls before their descent into the physical world were bisexual, a combination of male and female." 25 The foregoing Talmudic and Midrashic sources are among the exoteric texts to which R. Bacharach referred.
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Despite clear antecedents in rabbinic literature, R. Bacharach made a point of quoting the Zohar, the esoteric Torah, as his authoritative source. He would go on to use the Zohar's text to prove that all Jews, men and women alike, were present and equally obligated at the giving of the Torah at Sinai. 27 R. Bacharach was then on solid ground from both a kabbalistic and halakhic perspective when he asserted that all souls, male and female, were present at Sinai, received the Torah, and shared the same legal obligation to observe its commandments. If there was no metaphysical difference between men and women then it should follow that there was no halakhic difference between them either. For R. Bacharach, this confirms that women are obligated to perform the mitzvot just as men are.
R. Bacharach's stated his conclusion as follows: "From this perspective, [women] are definitely included in the acceptance of the entire Torah and in their role as guarantors [for its performance], just as the children and those under the age of twenty were included." He continued that, "the Sages taught that even unborn souls were present [and were included in the covenant]." Here R. Bacharach added the widely held belief that all Jews in every generation until the end of time, not only those who were physically present at the time, were included in the covenant at Sinai and were therefore enjoined to keep the mitzvot of the Torah. The Sages derived the principle from the following verses:
You stand this day, all of you, before the Lord your God-your tribal heads, your elders and your officials, all the men of Israel. . . I make this covenant, with its sanctions, not with you alone, but both with those who are standing here with us this day before the Lord our God and with those who are not with us here this day. (Deut. 29: 9, 13--14)
R. Bacharach combined the idea that all souls were present at Sinai, already noted in the Targum Jonathan, 28 with the notion that all souls are both male and female, and reached the inevitable conclusion that men and women alike are obligated to observe all the mitzvot of the Torah.
WOMEN'S EXEMPTION FROM TIME-BOUND COMMANDMENTS
Though convinced of the correctness of his conclusion, R. Bacharach noted that the Mishnah (Kiddushin 29a) teaches that women are exempt from a number of time-bound mitzvot such as sukkah, shofar, tzitzit and tefillin. He proceeded to explain the reason why they were excluded from the community of the obligated: it was due to their delicate nature and indecisiveness, 29 and the fact they are subject to their husband's authority, 30 along with other reasons known only to the Omniscient One, may His name be blessed, that [He] exempted them from timebound mitzvot, as the Sages learn from Biblical verses in the first chapter of Kiddushin 34--35.
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The reasons cited by R. Bacharach were all mentioned by earlier commentators, but nowhere does the Talmud itself cite a rationale for women's exemption. Although the Sages used proof-texts from the Torah, they did not suggest an underlying reason for the exemption.
32
But this partial exemption did not supersede what was for R. Bacharach a historical and halakhic reality-that women accepted the entire Torah along with men at Sinai, and thereby bear the same obligation. His conclusion went several steps further:
In any case, since they were present at the holy convocation, they are entitled to claim that "we do not wish to avail ourselves of the divine exemption, and we were included among those who accepted [the Torah]", and they are entitled to recite [the standard formula of the blessing] 'and commanded us.' Accordingly, [whenever] women recite the blessing over a time-bound positive commandment, they 'undertook and irrevocably obligated themselves,' [and] they can be regarded [as being] obligated.
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In other words, when a woman performs a commandment from which she is exempt, she accepts upon herself her primordial Sinaitic obligation, and this halakhic obligation enables her to legitimately recite the standard blessing.
MAKING AN OPTIONAL MITZVAH MANDATORY
At this point in the discussion, R. Bacharach cited a precedent for the above mentioned principle found in a ruling of R. Isaac Alfasi (the RIF, 1013--1103). 35 He regarded Arvit [the Evening Prayer] as an optional mitzvah that was accepted by the community, so that it was now considered obligatory. In the case of Arvit, Talmudic authorities initially disagreed as to its obligatory status. 36 Following a controversy that lasted for generations, it was determined that Arvit was optional, but since Jews had taken upon themselves to voluntarily recite it faithfully over the years, it had become a requirement. The geonic work Halakhot Gedolot coined the term "equivalent to an obligation" 37 in relation to the legal principle that an optional mitzvah can be observed as an obligation if the community accepts it as such. This principle was endorsed by Rabbenu Hananel and R. Hai Gaon, and R. Alfasi formulated it as follows: "Nowadays it is the practice to consider it [Arvit] an obligation." R. Bacharach understood this process in relation to an individual as well, and proceeded to apply it in the following example:
R. Joseph Caro ruled that women may recite the daily blessings on Torah study, which is not a time-bound commandment (from which they are exempt). Commenting in Mekor Hayyim (47:14, p. 207) on the fact that this decision contradicted R. Caro's repeated ruling that forbids women from reciting blessings over mitzvot from which they are exempt, R. Bacharach rejected the standard explanations offered to justify R. Caro's ruling as being weak and unfounded, and concludes as follows: This is not the approach of R. al-Fasi and his predecessor in the Halakhot Gedolot cited above by R. Bacharach. According to their view, "the nature of the Evening Prayer can change from being optional and become a mandatory prayer depending on the preference of the worshiper." In other words, "each individual establishes for himself his personal level of obligation vis-a-vis the evening prayer, by either accepting it as being mandatory, or not." 43 Blidstein's formulation is precisely the point to which R. Bacharach is referring. In the same way that an individual can determine for himself what his level of obligation will be insofar as the recitation of Arvit is concerned, so each individual woman is entitled to determine for herself what her level of obligation will be insofar as time-bound mitzvot are concerned. 44 Why was this so important to him? Why offer an involved kabbalistic justification for a legal ruling that was by this time largely accepted in practice by Ashkenazi Jewry? In my view, R. Bacharach inserted this passage to deliberately refute what was then a well-known kabbalistic position, namely, that women are forbidden to perform time-bound positive mitzvot, a premise that appears in the classic kabbalistic work Sefer Hakanah. In order to do so, he had to engage his opponent on his own playing ground, so to speak, by utilizing kabbalistic sources. Sefer Hakanah, and its companion volume Sefer Hapeliah, were composed by an anonymous author at the end of the fourteenth century. 48 Already in the early part of the sixteenth century, kabbalists viewed both these works as canonical, and the ideas contained in them had far-reaching influence. 49 Gershom Scholem records from a reliable contemporary report that Shabbetai Zvi studied only two kabbalistic works-the Zohar and Sefer Hakanah.
50
R. Bacharach was familiar with Sefer Hakanah, and cited it twice in his collection of responsa (nos 152 and 210), so it may be assumed that he had full command of its contents, as was the case with every other book that came into his hands.
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One of the extreme views that characterizes Sefer Hakanah and HaPeliah is the idea that halakha is not to be understood literally, but has only mystical meaning. "Sefer Hakanah," wrote Talya Fishman, "is unique in taking the uncompromising position that mitzvot (and rabbinic literature) can only be understood kabbalistically." 52 R. Bacharach took strong exception to this view in a lengthy responsum, and rejected kabbalistic interpretations when they deviated from the plain meaning of the Talmudic tradition, as the following sharp criticism reveals:
Yet, unless it be sinful so to say, I would say that the kabbalists only pegged their ideas onto the Mishnah and the Gemara, [i.e. they read their ideas into the Talmud without necessarily suggesting that theirs was the original meaning] in the manner in which one associates words of rebuke with the laws of the shofar, [i.e. reading an ethical and religious idea into the rite of blowing the ram's horn on the festival of Rosh ha-Shanah] rather than that the Tannaim themselves had these mysteries in mind. It is even less plausible with regard to the Gemara of the Amoraim whose aim it was to teach the people that which they should do. 53 On the question of gender, Sefer Hakanah emphatically denied women the right to perform time-bound mitzvot: "Women should not be permitted to perform any time-bound mitzvot from which they are exempt for that is the decree of the King, for their performance is harmful on high." 54 Its author rejected the position of R. Tam, who permitted women to recite blessings on such mitzvot, and contended that R. Tam's comparison of women to the blind was untenable:
They are not comparable. For the blind person, even though he is exempt from some commandments, still retains his rights and is subject to the divine command. However, since he was excluded from the 'model' [i.e. he lost his sight] he is also excluded from the [greater] reward [promised] to one who performs the mitzvot because he is commanded to do so. In any case, since he was once commanded, even though he is no longer, he receives his reward, even if not as one commanded . . . but a woman was never the subject of the directive to perform time-bound positive mitzvot, for she is exempt from them from her mother's womb (Italics mine, SA). She is not to come near, 'let no stranger come near.' (see Num. 18:4) R. Bacharach's position was diametrically opposed to this view. He held that a woman is indeed obligated from her mother's womb, or even before, and our passage clearly refutes the view of Sefer Hakanah. This is further evident upon examining Sefer Hakanah's position on the recitation of the blessing: "In any case, God forbid that she recites the blessing on the mitzvah, for how can she say . . . 'and commanded us' since she has not been commanded, and thus [she will] transgress the positive requirement of 'Keep far from a false matter?'" 55 This verse recalls R. Bacharach's formulation ("Is it not written" (Ps. 101:7) "he who speaks untruth shall not stand before my eyes?") which may well have aimed to signal his intentions at the outset. In any case, R. Bacharach's view stood in stark opposition to that of Sefer Hakanah, which he viewed as illegitimate. 56 R. Bacharach did not mention his opponent by name. However, in order to discredit this kabbalistic view among those who were influenced by it, he used a kabbalistic source-the Zohar--to disprove it. What could be more authoritative, after all, for one who venerates the Kabbalah, the Sefer Hakanah or the Zohar itself? It is clear that R. Bacharach, in this passage from his commentary to the code of Jewish law, intended to defend the right of women to perform timebound mitzvot, a matter that was likely very dear to him. R. Bacharach had the greatest regard for his grandmother, Rabbanit Chava, who lived in his house until he was thirteen, and he was also a great-grandson of the Maharal of Prague, and there were many learned women in the Maharal's family. On the tombstone of Feigele Katz, the Maharal's daughter, the following is inscribed: "She opens her mouth with wisdom, her tongue with kindness and Torah, she was learned in knowledge and understanding, in all the laws of the Gemara." 57 Feigele was Chava Bacharach's mother. It is reasonable to assume that these learned and pious women performed mitzvot from which they were exempt, and this was the environment in which R. Bacharach was raised. AFTERWORD By the late seventeenth century Kabbalah had emerged as a major influence in many areas of ritual life, and R. Bacharach was one of the first posekim to engage kabbalistic literature in a sustained manner in his Mekor Hayyim. 58 Rabbi Dr Twersky, z"l, wrote of R. Bacharach that, "Kabbalistic principles that enjoyed wide acceptance might be accepted. All others should be considered off limits." 59 Here, we have an example of a kabbalistic principle as expounded by Sefer Hakanahthat the performance of time-bound positive mitzvot by women is spiritually harmful and prohibited-that was unacceptable, and R. Bacharach found it necessary to reject it outright, but without mentioning its source. Those who were familiar with Sefer Hakanah and had accepted this principle in practice certainly would have understood the message.
It is conceivable that even to this day the view of the Sefer Hakanah has influenced certain Hasidic admorim to instruct their female followers not to perform time-bound positive mitzvot. The late Admor mi-Sanz, R. Yekutiel Yehuda Halberstam (1905--94), wrote in a responsum: "I heard from his honored holiness, my master, father and teacher, may his merit protect us, who heard it from the holy mouth of my master, my grandfather, that there are esoteric reasons (b'derech haEmet¼the way of truth) that make it preferable for women not to perform time-bound commandments." 60 R. Bacharach totally rejected this view. There is an additional factor against which R. Bacharach's exposition should be considered, namely, women's increased involvement in public ritual. In the seventeenth century, social contact between men and women was viewed with considerable alarm, and there are instances where communal and halakhic authorities attempted to restrict women's involvement in public ritual. In Rites and Passages: The Beginnings of Modern Jewish Culture in France, 1650-1860, Jay Berkovitz noted that, "these sources reflect a range of concerns about the involvement of women in public ritual, the intermingling of the sexes at liminal moments, and the disorderly conduct of public rites." 61 In addition, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the emergence of fresh rituals and genres of religious literature. Guides to the ethical life, books of pious practices, and new liturgies and rituals (often in abridged and simplified form) were published both for men and women: in Hebrew for those with a basic education in classical Jewish texts, and in Yiddish for women who lacked familiarity with Hebrew. Tkhines (prayers of supplication) were an important form of women's participation in this pietistic revival and its popular literature. These factors may well be the Sitz im Leben of our text. 3. Although R. Gumbiner began to write his commentary in 1665, R. Bacharach was not aware of it until it was finally published in 1692. When he saw it and the Turei Zahav commentary that was published with it, he began to write "booklets of critiques and insights on the two commentaries Magen Avraham and Turei Zahav" which overlapped with his commentary, but he did not complete the re-editing of his commentary that he intended. See Mekor Hayyim volume I, p.6, where he writes: "and if someone will be so good as to edit (my commentary) and produce an updated edition, and delete all the material already cited by these two authors, (R. Gumbiner and R. Halevi), and is able to publish it, may he be blessed, and let the profit from the printing belong to him, as well as his eternal reward. 43 . Rav Yosef summarizes the prohibitive opinions and insists that women from Sephardic communities are forbidden to recite the blessings on these commandments, despite the custom of some communities that permitted them to do so. See also R. Jacob Orenstein, Yeshu'ot Ya'akov (Lemberg, 1863), on the cited section 17, page 13, who rules that the law even forbids Ashkenazic women from reciting the blessing, citing a tradition for this ruling from the Hakham Zevi. A similar prohibitive ruling for Ashkenazic women is found in the responsa of R. Yekutiel Yehudah Teitelbaum, Avnei Zedek, no. 46 (Sighet, 1885). See the discussion in Halichot Beytah (n. 10) on p. 57. In all of halakhic literature, the question of the propriety of women (or anyone) reciting a blessing over a voluntary mitzvah is that such an act involves mentioning God's name in vain, which transgresses the commandment "You shall not swear falsely by the name of the LORD your God" (Ex. 20:7). Some say that this is a biblical prohibition; others say that it is rabbinic in nature, and still others say that since a woman may accept upon herself the obligation of the mitzvah, her blessing is justified and she does not transgress the prohibition at all. See the discussion in Yabia Omer, op. cit. 
